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n 1997 the world's press devoted an extraordinary amount of space to discussions of the only "reverse transition", when the very wealthy six million inhabitants of the city-state of Hong Kong were merged with the 1.2 billion "red" Chinese in the People's Republic of China. The People's Republic currently is a very poor (GNP per capita in 1995: $620), though rapidly growing (8.3% per annum 1985-95) country, ruled by a single-party government, which continues to be willing to suppress dissent quite brutally. On the other hand, Hong Kong's GNP per capita, at about $23,000, was well ahead of that of its erstwhile colonial master. the United Kingdom (somewhat below $20,000). It is interesting to start the analysis of the East Asian model with the case of Hong Kong. As Thomas Sowell pointed out nearly fifteen years ago, 1 the economic prospects of a densely populated and resource-poor country, which was still a Western colony, must have appeared very bleak: "This country must be doomed unless it receives large external donations."
The situation in Singapore, also a British colony until its independence in 1959, was about the same: today it has a slightly smaller population, but a higher GNP ($26,730) , and a considerably more activist government. Two other resource-poor countries. South Korea (around $9,000) and Taiwan (at $12,000) are former Japanese colonies, which have started from a very low level of output and income, and have grown very rapidly indeed. All four of these countries as a special group have earned various nicknames: the "Gang of Four", the "Asian NICs" (for Newly Industrialized Countries), the "Four Dragons", or "the Asian tigers". When a few other Southeast Asian * Georgetown University, Washington D.C., USA, and Bank of Latvia, Riga, Latvia.
countries are added to this group, along with Japan, they might be called the "capitalist-roaders of Asia". Extensive literature exists about "the East Asian miracle", seeking to explain the extraordinary performance of these countries. As the 1997 Economic Report of the President pointed out, during the last three decades eight of the world's ten fastest-growing economies were in East and Southeast Asia -and they have achieved this very rapid growth without experiencing large income disparities. 2
Where do the Baltic states stand? Now that they have regained independence, can they catch up with the "tigers"? Historically, all three were well above the all-Union average income in the Soviet period. As can be seen in Table 1 , Latvia's GNP per capita in 1970 was estimated at a little more than one-half of the US level, at a little more than two-thirds of that in West Germany, and even slightly ahead of Japan. In the 1970s, all three Baltic "SSRs" were certainly well ahead of the levels attained by the Asian tigers, which were just beginning their sustained growth process. Both South Korea and Taiwan had "graduated" from USAID economic assistance only around 1965, and were slowly adjusting their policies from import substitution industrialization policies to an outwardlooking strategy of promoting foreign trade and investment. Most other Asian countries were still quite reliant on foreign assistance. A further look at ground relative to the USA and Western Europe, but that Japan (and by then a number of the "tigers") had surged ahead mightily. Still, in 1980 the standard of living in the three westernmost republics of the USSR was quite high; in those days, they were the showp=eces of a large and rich empire. Visitors from Cuba, Nicaragua, or Vietnam could be taken for a bite of pizza at the prosperous Adazi collective farm not very far from Riga, and would undoubtedly be quickly convinced that life under "advanced socialism" would be just fine.
Still, the systematic flaws of the Stalinist central planning model were becoming more and more obvious, and the peoples in vanous nations living under Moscow's domination were feeling quite restive. A detailed enumeration of the reasons for the collapse of the CMEA in early 1991 and the USSR itself later the same year, is beyond the scope of this paper. Certainly, environmental degradation, waste of natural resources, persistent shortages, and the "soft budget constraint", (discussed by Hungarian economist Janos Kornai at great length), as well as a significant lessening of state terrorism were major factors in the economic disintegration. With greater democratization, the decentralization of decisionmaking weakened Moscow's control over revenues, credit and foreign exchange, and greatly strengthened the position of local political leaders. This quickly led to even greater shortages as each unit tried to maximize resource extraction from its trading partners. Political reform, "glasnost" (meaning honesty and openness) in a sense succeeded, while "perestroika" (economic restructuring) did not accomplish much. Still, greater freedom of expression fanned the flames of nationalism in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Baltic states (all wishing to rejoin Western civilization), and the other non-Russian republics quickly spun off as independent entities as well. 3
The East Asian Tigers
The economic development and growth of Japan and the other "capitalist-roaders of Asia" has been discussed and analyzed at great length by historians, social scientists and the media. For many people, their success has been explained rather sire plistically: it is often alleged that they did so well mainly because of the so-called Cold War. The United States (and its allies) sought to surround the Communist world -the USSR, the People's Republic of China, North Korea and North Vietnam -with reliable non-CommLnist clients. The most important such clients were Japan itself ("an unsinkable aircraft carrier in northeast Asia") as well as Taiwan, across the straits from "red China", South Korea, as a counter to the "juche" (self-reliance policy) of the North, and South Vietnam, which was eventually lost to leftist public opinion in the USA. Stil, the protracted fighting in Vietnam gave a bit of breathing room for Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, all potential dominos, who managed to deal successfully with Communist-led insurgency movements. Thus, the United States su pported all of these clients by economic assistance and investment flows, but -most importantly -by providing a wideopen and free market for their exports. Furthermore, the USA seemed to be willing to provide political support for even rather unsavoury government leaders (e.g. Marcos in the Philippines), as long as they were decidedly anti-Communist. Thus, economic growth in these countries was mainly dependent upon export expansion: very simply, they were export platforms receiwng US geopolitical support." However, the chain of causality running from exports to income/output growth needs to be reversed, although it probably runs in both directions. In other words, export expansion can be possible only if domestic output expands sufficiently: if the local
